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ABSTRACT. In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I 
use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first 
step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, 
where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or 
from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may 
play in  solving the  problem of  mental  causation is  evaluated.  It  is  argued that  no 
solution based on the determinable/determinate relation is viable without begging the 
question as regards the individuating conditions of the related properties. Next, it is 
shown that  Robb’s  solution,  much in  the  spirit  of  Davidson’s  anomalous  monism, 
entails abandoning the assumption that tropes are essentially simple, a consequence 
that I find not acceptable. My conclusion is that these entities are of no help in solving 
the problem of mental causation, and that a universalist approach should be preferred.
1. Introduction1
In the past few years, a number of authors have argued that tropes can play 
a crucial role in solving many of the conundrums connected with the causal 
status  of  mental  properties.  In  particular,  if  one  adheres  to  Davidson’s 
anomalous  monism,  as  Robb  1997  does,  these  entities,  more  than 
properties  conceived  as  universals,  are  appropriate  to  meet  the  many 
requirements that are set to face the issue of mental causation. My aim in 
this  paper  is  to  argue  that  tropes  are  not  suitable  for  such  a  task.  In 
particular, the key assumption that allows tropes to carry the burden of the 
solution is, in my view, incompatible with one of the crucial features of 
tropes themselves, that is, their simplicity. In order to clarify all this, the 
first  step  is  that  of  qualifying  tropes  by  making  explicit  their  essential 
features.
1 For comments on a previous draft, and a far ancestor, of this paper I express my 
gratitude to Francesco Orilia and David Robb. I thank Vicky Michela for the precious 
editing she provided.
2. Tropes
The notion of trope has not had a smooth history in philosophy. It could be 
traced  in  notions  such  as  individual  accident in  Aristotle  and  in  the 
Scholastics,  mode in  Locke  (see  Lowe,  this  volume)  and  property  of  
monads in  Leibniz.  However  it  received  greater  attention  in  the  last 
century,  when Williams 1953 decided to  use  the same word Santayana 
used to pick the essence of an occurrence. Williams’ end, however, was the 
opposite: he took “trope” to pick the occurrence of an essence. Campbell 
(in  both  his  1981 and 1990 works),  following Stout  1921,  has  defined 
tropes as abstract particulars, thus interrupting a tradition that contrasted 
properties,  taken  as  abstract  entities,  with  particulars,  considered  as 
concrete items. His idea was that the two contrasts, abstracts vs. concretes 
and universals  vs. particulars,  were  logically  independent  one  from the 
other, and so it  was conceptually admissible to scrutinize other possible 
intersections  beyond  the  usual  two  abstract  universals  and  concrete 
particulars. It is with this spirit that abstracts particulars have been isolated 
as crucial items to face many of the dilemmas concerning properties taken 
as  universals  (and  Williams  has  even  mentioned  “concrete  universals”, 
such as Socratesity).
One of the main reasons to introduce tropes in metaphysics has been 
that of placing universals, so to say, down at ground zero. Campbell 1981 
takes  tropes  to  have  moderated  the  metaphysical  scandal  of  imagining 
entities, as universals are taken to be, that are scattered through space and 
time  while  enjoying  the  paradoxical  form  of  being  wholly  present 
wherever and whenever they are instantiated. On the contrary, tropes are 
not repeatable entities: any trope completely exists in a specific space-time 
location, hence they are particulars. To compare universals and tropes let 
us  consider  red.  If  red is  taken as  a  property,  a  universal,  it  could  be 
considered as wholly existing in each singular instance even if no instance 
is necessary for its existence, provided that there is at least one instance. 
On the other hand, if red is taken as a trope, we have to interpret it as this-
red-now, and it is thoroughly realized in a specific space-time location, in 
such a way that it  cannot be repeated. What is more, tropes  have to be 
space-time located.  This  is  a  substantive  issue:  for  instance,  Armstrong 
1989 thinks that unistantiated universals, possibly defended by Plato in the 
Republic, should not be accepted, being the upshot of a semantic fallacy 
resulting from the assumption that every predicate gets its meaning from a 
prior existing universal. But the possibility of unistantiated tropes is self-
136
contradictory, given their intrinsic space-time nature. This might entail that 
postulating  tropes  presupposes  something  like  a  realistic  stance  on  the 
space-time structure, a point I wish to leave aside.
At the same time, and here we come to the second distinguishing 
feature of tropes,  this-red-now can be space-time compresent with other 
tropes.  For  instance,  following  Williams,  consider  a  lollipop:  it  is  red, 
sweet and round. So, this-red-now, this-sweet-now and this-round-now all 
share the same space-time location. Now, if two or more concrete items 
were in the same space-time location they would be identical; but this-red-
now, this-sweet-now and  this-round-now are  not  identical,  having  quite 
different individuation conditions. Because they are in the same space-time 
and are not identical, they must be  abstract. There is a way to challenge 
this argument: this statue and the clay it is made of are in the same (region 
of) space-time but they are not identical: the clay, but not this statue, could 
have been of a different shape. However, between this-red-now and this-
sweet-now there is not a relation of constitution, like one that holds for the 
statue and the clay. So, we may counter the above argument by saying that 
compresent entities are abstract,  provided that they are not related by a 
constitutional relation.2
This  second  feature  of  tropes,  abstractness,  received  a  cognitive 
reading in Campbell’s 1981 paper. He thinks that we may get the lollipop’s 
redness by abstracting it away from its other tropes, for instance its flavor 
and shape. This does not make the red in question a purely mental feature: 
that  red is  perfectly objective,  but  it  needs a  cognitive act  to isolate  it. 
Hence,  the  abstractness  of  tropes,  according  to  Campbell,  is  not  the 
consequence  of  space-time  compresence,  but  rather  of  an  act  of 
abstraction, or mental focusing. In the following, I will mainly insist that 
the space-time compresence is the crucial feature for abstractness, even if 
nothing will crucially depend on such an assumption.
A third feature of tropes is, as Maurin 2002 insists, their  simplicity. 
This seems to be the result of their being both particular  and abstract. In 
fact, particularity and abstractness are individuation conditions for tropes 
in  that  tropes  are  specific  features  of  a  given  space-time  location.  As 
Campbell  uses  to  say,  any  abstract  feature  of  a  space-time  location 
“monopolizes” it in that, in that very space-time location, you cannot have 
2 Simons 1994 notes that an entity is abstract if it is not in space and time. For him, 
then, tropes are not abstract in this sense; rather they are abstract because they exist 
only  inasmuch as  they  depend on  something  else  to  exist.  Abstractness  would  be 
parasitic  on  concreteness,  though,  thereby  excluding  a  possible  world  comprising 
solely abstract entities.
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a second feature for the same dimension. For instance, if the lollipop is red, 
in that space-time position you cannot have a different feature in the colour 
dimension, while you can have some feature for the taste dimension, i.e. 
sweet.  The  colour  dimension  in  that  space-time  location,  then,  is 
monopolized  by that  shade  of  red.  Here  “dimensions”  can  be  taken as 
characterizing qualities, of any kind. This view somewhat entails the old 
substratum-property theory, which one may want to avoid in favor of a 
bundle view (Simons 1994, Robb 2005). Moreover, it seems that simplicity 
would  not  play  any  substantive  role  over  and  above  particularity  and 
abstractness. So, what is the distinguishing feature of simplicity vis-à-vis 
particularity and abstractness? 
The  concept  of  abstractness,  as  we  saw,  requires the  concept  of 
compresence and this, in turn, presupposes that what is compresent cannot 
be  further  decomposed,  otherwise  compresence  would  require 
compresence, in an endless regress. Because the compresents that cannot 
be further decomposed are qualities, then these qualities have to be simple. 
Simplicity, however, is not conceptually connected to abstractness just in 
case the latter is interpreted as compresence. It may be thus connected also 
in  case  abstractness  is  taken  as  the  result  of  an  act  of  abstraction,  or 
conceptual  focusing,  as  Campbell  suggests.  If  I  focus  on  this  colour,  I 
abstract such a trope away from all other tropes this entity may have. If I 
get  to a  trope such that  a further act  of  abstraction leads to a  different 
result, then the trope I got to was not the simplest one. So, when one gets 
to a trope such that no further act of abstraction is available then one is 
abstracting a simple trope. In sum, on both construals the full abstractness 
of a trope requires the simplicity of the trope.
We may look at this issue from a different perspective. According to 
Williams, tropes participate in two kinds of combination groups: on the 
one side they concur in the sum that constitutes concrete objects (as said, 
this lollipop is the sum of at least this colour plus this flavour plus this 
shape) giving rise to the bundle theory of particulars—this is our notion of 
compresence; on the other side, each trope falls into the set or class of all 
tropes that have with it the relation of being precisely similar. Here is how 
Williams 1953, 117, expresses the point: “Speaking roughly … the set … 
of tropes precisely similar to a given trope … is the abstract universal or 
‘essence’ which it may be said to exemplify”. This is not to say that tropes 
are the instantiation of universals, rather that some generality is in order in 
the case of tropes as well. In this way,  this-red-now and  this-sphere-now 
are two compresent tropes pertaining to two different classes of similarity. 
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It is in this framework that objects are thought of as bundles of compresent 
tropes.
However, because of the space-time nature of tropes, simplicity may 
turn out to be a somewhat complicated concept. Here is Ehring: 
Unlike  universals,  tropes  cannot  characterize  more  than  one 
object at the same time, but tropes can persist over time. We 
may now add that tropes will be either simple or compound. A 
simple trope does not have tropes as proper parts. A minimum-
charge trope, if there are such minimums, is an example of a 
simple  trope.  A  compound  trope  includes  another  trope  as  a 
proper part.
Ehring 1997, 117.3
An  object  having  an  electric  charge  that  is  not  a  minimum  charge  is 
considered, by Ehring as well as by Campbell, as having compound tropes 
of  the conjunctive kind.  Compound tropes can also be of the structural 
kind. These are individuated by way of their relation to other tropes. Being 
one  meter  in  length,  says  Ehring  following  Armstrong’s  description  of 
structural  universals,  individuates  the  property  that  something  has  as  a 
result of having two adjacent half-meter length tropes (or more than two 
adjacent tropes of lesser length): “The length of this particular ruler is a 
structural trope composed of length tropes adjacent to each other” (ibid., 
118).  
However, it seems to me that if the distinction between conjunctive 
and structural composite tropes is to be established, it deserves a firmer 
ground. Consider a musical chord of C major: it is the result of playing C, 
E and G together.  As such,  it  is  a  compound trope,  resulting from the 
compresence of simpler tropes—C, E and G. However, such a trope, while 
composite,  is  phenomenally  simple;  it  is  perceived as  a  single  musical 
item. Similarly, violet is a compound trope formed by red plus black. At 
the same time it is phenomenally simple, because it is so perceived and 
taken. Now, neither in the electric charge case, nor in the ruler length, is 
there any substantial difference in the constituent tropes. This part of the 
charge is not any different from that part of the charge, if the distinction 
makes any sense, and the difference between this half-length and that half 
length of the ruler is, at most, spatial—one is to the left of the other with 
3 Hochberg 2004 manifests  a  deep dissatisfaction with the idea of  locating tropes’ 
simplicity in their having no parts. Its polemical target is Maurin 2002.
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respect to me—and, as such, it plays no role in the overall length of the 
ruler.  In  the  case  of  the  chord  or  violet,  the  composing  tropes  are 
substantially different—C, E and G, red and black—allowing for variation
—a stronger playing of the C key on the piano keyboard results in the C 
major chord having a different sound from that resulting from striking with 
more intensity the E key, so that the difference results in the composed 
trope  by  virtue  of  differences  in  the  relations  between  the  composing 
tropes.
So,  I  would  take  both  the  charge  and  the  length  cases  to  be 
representative of conjunctive composite tropes, while the cases of chords 
and non-primary colours representative of structural composite tropes. In 
both cases, the analyses can be established only by assuming that there are 
simple tropes, which form the basis of composition. We may call  these 
structurally simple tropes, while the tropes they give rise to, like C major 
or violet, phenomenally simple. We will consider a role for such distinction 
in the following.
Furthermore,  consider  a  chair,  red  and  thus-and-so  shaped.  In  its 
space-time  location  we  have  the  red  trope  and  the  chair-shaped  trope. 
However, let’s further imagine, while the red is homogeneous in all the 
chair’s parts, it is just the same shade of red, the shape is not. The shape of 
the seat  is different from that  of  the back:  inverting their position with 
respect to the legs, for instance, would result in a different overall shape, 
let’s say in one uncomfortable chair.  Hence, the shape of the chair is a 
composite trope, because we can distinguish parts of it that are different 
along the individuating dimension—shape—and structural. However, the 
structure of the chair’s shape is more articulated than the musical chord, 
because  in  the  former case  its  composing tropes cannot  be  recombined 
without variations in the resulting composite trope. It makes no sense to 
say  that  the  C  chord  composed  of  C,  G  and  E  is  different  from that 
composed of G, E and C, if the respective keys on the keyboard are played 
simultaneously.  So,  we  have  a  compound  chair-shaped  trope,  having 
simple  tropes  (shape  of  the  seat  and shape  of  the  back)  as  its  base  of 
composition. Simplicity, then, is in my view a crucial feature of tropes, 
allowing  us  to  understand  the  basic  compositional  grammar  of  tropes 
themselves.  Admitting  tropes’  simplicity  is  a  necessary  step  for 
considering tropes as the alphabet of being.
The last point that should be considered with regard to tropes vis-à-
vis universals is  the resemblance relation,  taken as a  way to regain the 
type-token distinction. Tropes as such are token properties, while on the 
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type side one must consider classes of resembling tropes, either naturally 
or  nominalistically  considered.  Laws  of  nature,  for  instance,  even  if 
expressed in terms of universals, would in fact refer to classes of precisely 
resembling tropes. Here the notion of resemblance has to be considered a 
primitive  one,  so  that  judging something  as  resembling  something else 
must be considered as a direct apprehension in an act of acquaintance. For 
instance, we judge two patches of red as being precisely similar to each 
other simply by observing them, and taking such observation as a self-
standing justification of any statement of similarity (this is Williams and 
Campbell’s position). And tropes, taken as the  respects in which objects 
resemble  each  other,  are  “realistically  conceived  universals”  (Campbell 
1981, 134). 
However,  resemblance  as  the  feature  through  which  tropes  are 
collected  together  in  classes,  should  not  be  considered  only  in  its 
perceptual construal. In fact, we may say that all electrons have precisely 
similar charge tropes without taking this similarity as being grasped by an 
act  of  acquaintance.  In  this  case,  the  similarity  judgment  is  driven  by 
causal considerations (see Simons 1994), so that tropes can be placed in 
the same resemblance class also when they have the same causal role, that 
is,  if  they  have  similar  causes  and  similar  effects.4 Ehring  1997  has 
maintained that the metaphysical task of solving the problem of causation 
is  a major one for which tropes are invoked.  He thinks that tropes can 
replace  states  of  affairs,  facts  or  events  as  causal  relata for  any single 
causal relation.5
So,  properties-as-universals  and tropes differ  in the way in  which 
they  cope  with  causation.  Properties  figure  as  the  vehicles  for  causal 
interactions between events. An event c is said to be a cause if and only if 
there is  at  least  one property that  determines the occurrence of another 
event e. The stone is the cause of the shattering of the window if and only 
if  there  is  at  least  one property of  it,  its  force  or  its  shape or  …, that 
determines the shattering; the mental event of deciding is the cause of the 
raising of the arm if and only if there is at least one property of it, being a 
desire to do such and such, that determines the raising. However, since no 
causal relation in the world is exactly determined solely by the properties 
4 One may wonder whether a resembling b in virtue of a’s causal roles resembling b’s 
causal roles could bring to some sort of regress. Moreover, if properties are placed into 
lawlike relations, these would connect sets of resembling relations, becoming second 
order relations. I leave these points aside.
5 On this issue see section 4 in Orilia 2008.
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called  for  in  its  description  or  explanation,  we  need  to  hedge  such 
epistemic statements with provisos and caeteris paribus clauses. 
Tropes, on the other hand, bearing within the epistemic statements 
the specific conditions in which the causal relation took place, make the 
extra ingredient typical of the  caeteris paribus conditions dispensable: it 
has  been  precisely  this  rock  throwing that  has  determined  this  glass 
shattering. Another throwing would have resulted in a different shattering. 
This makes tropes subject to very thin and subtle individuation conditions, 
that  is,  their  unrepeatableness  and  space-time  location  determines  a 
singular causal relation. Now, how can tropes help to solve the problem of 
mental causation?
3. The problem of mental causation
The causal efficacy of mental properties seems to be jeopardized by the 
acceptance of the principle of causal closure of the physical domain along 
with the denial of overdetermination. The principle says that if a physical 
event  has  a  cause  at  t, it  has  a  physical  cause  at  t, while  denying 
overdetermination  amounts  to  rejecting  the  idea  that  events  may 
systematically  have two or  more  causes that  are  independently  and not 
jointly sufficient.
It can be easily seen why adopting the principle creates a tension for 
the causal efficacy of mental events and properties. If the raising of my 
arm is a physical event, as is reasonable to think, then it must have had a 
physical cause at some previous time t. Now, the mental event which is my 
decision to raise my arm either is a physical cause or it is not. If the first 
option is accepted, then the mental is efficacious just because it is physical; 
if it is the second one that is endorsed, then the mental is causally idle or 
the principle should be abandoned. If one wants to keep the principle, then 
the mental does not play any causal role by itself in either case, unless one 
considers my mental property as concurring with some physical property 
of my brain in causing my raising the arm. 
However, such concurrence overdetermines the cause of my raising 
the arm since it appeals to two different causes. The difficulty with this 
position  is  that  it  seems  unnecessary  to  imagine  such  a  metaphysical 
richness  in  the  physical  domain.  One  possible  retort  is  to  observe  that 
mental  overdetermination  is  not  concurrence  (two  singularly  sufficient 
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causes)  but  compresence  (mental  and  physical  properties  working 
together), a retort somewhat aired by Tim Crane. According to him, 
if  we  believe  that  mental  and  physical  states  are  linked  by 
psychophysical laws—a claim which is defensible on independent 
grounds—then overdetermination would not be a coincidence: it 
would be a matter of natural law that the mental and the physical 
causes both bring about the effect.
Crane 1995, 19. 
How are these laws supposed to work? If mental  and physical properties 
go hand in hand in causing, then each of them is singularly necessary while 
they both are jointly sufficient for the causing. This entails that my being in 
pain cause my taking the aspirin if and only if I have such and such brain 
state. So both properties are causally idle by themselves. Such an option, 
however, is open to two lines of reply. First, the physical cause in question 
is not the right one (and this is the reason why it results as not sufficient); 
second, how is the mental giving the “extra-bump” to the physical effect if 
not  in  physical  terms?  It  seems then,  that  overdetermination  should  be 
excluded as a viable metaphysical option. A last option is taking the mental 
and  the  physical  properties  to  be  identical.  However,  since  properties 
figure in laws as types, this solution would be tantamount to so called type-
identity theory of mind.
A  straightforward  way  to  meet  causal  closure  without 
overdetermination while saving mental causation is to identify the mental 
with the physical.  However,  the  type-identity  theory has been seriously 
attacked since the sixties.6 The token identity theory, on the contrary, when 
applied to properties, states that a mental  properties occurring in space-
time is identical to a physical property, one that occurs at the same time 
and at the same location. Famously, Donald Davidson defended the token 
6 Adopting a kimian metaphysics, the identity of mental and physical events follows 
from the identity of mental and physical properties. According to Kim 1976, in fact, 
events are structured entities comprising an  object having a  property at a  time.  So, 
once the identity-conditions for the object and the time are secured, a viable option, 
the identity theory reduces to property identity in that having pain now is identical to 
having brain state B now if and only if the property of having pain is type identical to 
the  property  of  having  state  B.  Davidson  1969,  vice  versa,  takes  event  to  be 
nonstructured  entities.  An event  is  mental  if  individuated  through a  description  in 
which mental predicates occur; it is physical if physical predicates are used. On Kim’s 
construal of the individuation-conditions for event identity see Orilia 2008.
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identity theory by holding three different principles: mental events causally 
interact with physical events; events related as cause and effect are covered 
by strict deterministic laws; there are no strict deterministic laws that cover 
mental events. He argues that the three principles, apparently at odds with 
each other, are consistent. He does this by stressing that, while causation is 
an extensional relation (any causal relation holds no matter how events are 
described) predictions and explanations,  which are possible  in virtue of 
laws, are intensional, thus crucially depending on the way in which events 
are described. 
It  is  in  this  respect  that  a  sort  of  “ambiguity” with  regard  to  the 
individuation of events finds its place: laws establish correlations between 
types  of  events;  since  mental  types,  given  their  holistic  and  normative 
character,  are  quite  distinct  from  physical  types,  there  is  no  way  of 
establishing laws comprising them at this level. On the other hand, given 
the extensional nature of causal relations, there is no problem in identifying 
mental and physical events as tokens. Therefore, Davidson relies on the 
type-token “ambiguity”  of  events:  mental  events  are  type  distinct  from 
physical  events,  thus  safeguarding  their  epistemological  autonomy,  but 
they are token identical to them, thus allowing their causal efficacy.
Davidson’s solution has been charged with epiphenomenalism. The 
problem is that causation is guaranteed by subsumption under a law, but 
such  a  subsumption  is  possible  only  by  considering  physicalistic 
descriptions of events, and a description is physicalistic in that it takes into 
account just physical properties picked out by physical predicates. So, an 
event is causally efficacious only inasmuch as it is individuated through its 
physical properties. As Kim, in his 1989, 35, has argued, “on anomalous 
monism, events are causes and effects only as they instantiates physical 
laws,  and this  means  that  an event’s  mental  properties  make no causal 
difference”.
Davidson’s reply has centred on the irrelevance of descriptions as to 
causation: 
if causal relations and causal powers inhere in particular events 
and objects, then the way those events and objects are described, 
and  the  properties  we  happen  to  employ  to  pick  them out  or 
characterize them, cannot affect what they cause.
Davidson 1993, 8. 
And also: 
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For  me  is  events  that  have  causes  and  effects.  Given  the 
extensionalist view of causal relations, it makes literally no sense 
[…] to  speak of  an event  causing something as  mental,  or  by 
virtue  of  its  mental  properties,  or  as  described  in  a  way  or 
another.
Ibid, 13. 
However, it seems that the problem is still there. For, as Kim 1993 
protests, the causal efficacy is captured by the instantiation of a law, and 
since mental predicates cannot be mentioned in strict causal laws, because 
strict laws describable by means of mentalist vocabulary are deemed not to 
exist, the presence of mental properties in a given event guarantees nothing 
more than their relevance. So, mental properties are at most relevant but 
not efficacious with respect to causal relations.
It is important to consider the reason Davidson mentions as a source 
of confusion in his critics. 
Why have there been so many confusions and bad arguments in 
the  discussion  of  AM,  AM+P,  and  supervenience?7 The  main 
source of confusion, I think, is in the fact that when it comes to 
events people find it hard to keep in mind the distinction between 
types and particulars.
Davidson 1993, 15. 
Davidson thinks that the causal efficacy of properties manifests itself 
if it makes a causal difference in the powers of individual events, and that 
the idea of identifying it with the causal efficacy of physical properties is 
the  result  of  confusing  particulars  with  types  of  events.  Consider  the 
following example by Sosa 1984. Someone is killed by a loud shot. The 
loudness, however, is irrelevant to the death: had the shot be silent it would 
have killed the victim anyway. Mental events or properties, Sosa argues, 
are  analogous  to  the  loudness  of  the  shot,  hence  they  are  causally 
inefficacious.  Davidson points out that  the counterfactual  is  ambiguous: 
even if the silent shot would have resulted in one death, 
7 By “AM” Davidson means anomalous monism, by “P” the premises that (i) mental 
events are causally related to physical events and (ii) that singular causal relations are 
backed by strict laws, which are the new formulations for the firsts two principles 
already mentioned.
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[…] It would not have been the  same shot as the fatal shot, nor 
could  the  death  it  caused  have  been  the  same  death.  The 
ambiguity lies in the definite description ‘the shot’: if ‘the shot’ 
refers to the shot that would have been fired silently, then it is 
true that that shot might well have killed the victim. But if ‘the 
shot’ is supposed to refer to the original loud shot, the argument 
misfires,  for  the  same  shot  cannot  be  both  loud  and  silent. 
Loudness,  like  a  mental  property,  is  supervenient  on  basic 
physical properties, and so makes a difference to what an event 
that has it causes. Of course, both loud and silent (single) shots 
can cause a death; but not the same death.
Ibid., 17.
In  this  passage  Davidson is  clearly  adopting  what  we may call  a 
trope view of events.8 A similar strategy has been pursued by David Robb 
1997, along the lines suggested by Davidson9, and by Ehring 1999. Robb’s 
basic  idea  is,  again,  to  trade  in  the  type/token  “ambiguity”,  this  time 
applied to properties, so as to have one reading of property at the general, 
type,  level  and  another  at  the  implementation,  token,  level.  In  Robb’s 
terms, the problem of mental causation is how to reconcile the following 
three principles: 
Distinctness: mental properties are not physical properties;10 
Closure: every physical event/property has in its causal history only 
physical events/properties; 
Relevance: mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to  
physical properties. 
Robb’s idea is to construe “properties” as types in Distinctness, in order to 
differentiate the mental  and the physical,  and to read them as tropes in 
Closure and  Relevance,  warranting  in  this  way  their  causal  relevance 
without violating the principle of causal closure (Robb 1997, 187-8). Here 
is how Robb expresses the point: “Although second-order mental types and 
the first-order physical types that realize them are distinct, their tropes are 
the same” (ibid., 190). 
8 On this see Orilia 2008, section 3.
9 But see John Heil 2003 as well.
10 On some interpretation of the principle the same holds for events.
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The difficulty in this approach, however, is the following. Consider a 
mental trope, call it  m. In order for this trope to be a  mental trope it has 
either  to  be  the  referent  of  a  predicative  expression  concerning mental 
properties or to manifest a causal pattern of interactions typical of mental 
properties. In either case, if m is to be a mental trope, it must be subsumed 
within a “second-order mental type”. But this very trope has to be, at the 
same time, a physical trope. In order to determine what type of property a 
given trope is, one has to refer to the class or type it belongs to. So, if  m 
has to be counted also as physical, then m belongs to a physical type too. 
The outcome is that m belongs both to a physical and to a mental type. If 
this is the case, either m is not a simple trope, because if types are different 
and the trope belongs to both then it is the concurrence of two tropes, or 
mental  and  physical  tropes  are  type-identical,  thus  violating  the 
distinctness condition because what makes mental and physical properties 
different is their belonging to distinct types. So, the crucial question here is 
whether a mental and a physical trope can be identical solely at the token, 
or realization, level.
This problem can be formulated in a somewhat different way: can an 
event, taken as a trope (in line with my reading of Davidson), instantiate 
more than one type of property? Or, in Robb’s terms, can we have one and 
the  same  trope  participating  in  two  different  resemblance  classes? 
According  to  Cynthia  and  Graham  MacDonald  1986,  147,  having 
suspicions about such manoeuvres is a sort of dualist prejudice. Events can 
instantiate more than one property, because 
‘property’  here  is  ambiguous  between  properties  and  their 
instances. … it may well be the case that one and the same event 
is both an instance of the property, being a desire for a drink, and 
an instance of another, physical property, say, being a brain event, 
where being an instance of the former just is being an instance of 
the latter. 
Ibid., 148. 
Shifting  the  focus  on  properties,  Ehring  1999,  21,  affirms:  “The  same 
property instance can be picked out by way of its membership in multiple 
classes, under different types”.
However, in a recent and thoughtful paper, the MacDonalds reject 
the trope view, proposing in its place an exemplificationist view of events. 
In particular, they argue that the trope solution to the problem of mental 
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causation is effective as long as one considers the causal efficacy of events. 
If the attention is, instead, on the causal relevance of mental properties, the 
trope route is not viable. In its place, it is preferable to consider properties 
as universals exemplified by events, these intended,  à la Kim, as triples 
comprising properties had by object at a time. Moreover, the MacDonalds 
insist on the “ambiguity” of the concept of property, according to the trope 
view.  Properties  can  be  either  instancing,  hence  individual  tropes,  or 
universal, so classes of perfectly resembling tropes.
Now, how can we make sense of the idea that one and the same trope 
participates  in  two  classes  of  resembling  tropes,  or  that  one  event 
exemplifies more than one property? The MacDonalds answer, applicable 
to  Robb’s  theory  of  tropes,  is  given  in  the  context  of  their 
exemplificationist account: 
Crucially,  this  amounts  to  the  claim  that  there  is  just  one 
exemplifying of two properties, one mental, and one physical, by 
an  object  at  a  time.  That  this  is  possible  is  apparent  from 
determinate/determinable examples, such as being coloured and 
being  red  …  Unlike  the  determinate/determinable  property 
relation,  the relation between mental  and physical  properties is 
not both metaphysical and conceptual. 
C. MacDonald and G. MacDonald 2006, 561.
They conclude that in their view the relation between mental and physical 
properties is just metaphysical.11 Leaving aside the view espoused by the 
MacDonalds, I want to scrutinize the possibility of having such a rich view 
of events and the idea that tropes can belong to more than one class of 
resemblance.
Let me start with the idea that one trope can belong to two or more 
resemblance  classes  in  virtue  of  the  determinable/determinate  relation. 
Stephen Yablo 1992 has argued that mental and physical properties can be 
thus  viewed,  with  the  mental  as  a  determinable  and  the  physical  as  a 
determinate. Thus, my having pain is determinable inasmuch as it can be 
realized by this or that neural state, and my having those C-fibres firing is a 
maximally determinate property because it cannot be further determined. If 
the mental and the physical were in such a relation, there would not be any 
11 However, from a subsequent footnote we learn that “we do not think that the relation 
between mental  and  physical  properties  is  as  determinable/determinate  relation,  as 
standard cases of this relation involve conceptual entailment of the determinable from 
the determinate property” (ibid., 563, n. 43).
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causal  competition.  However,  it  seems  to  me  that  mental  and  physical 
properties give rise to  two independent series of determination relations. 
Consider my having pain now. Is it a maximally determinable state or is it 
a somewhat middle way? For instance, the determinable of my having pain 
now is  my  having  an  unpleasant  sensory  feeling  now,  which  has  as  a 
determinable  my  having  a  conscious  state  now.  Running  on  the  other 
thread of the relation, my having pain now could have as a determinate my 
having pain in my left hand now, which in turn could have, as a maximally 
determinate trope, my having a throbbing, intense pain on the upper left 
corner of the palm of my left hand now. 
My having C-fibres firing now, vice versa, finds a determinable in 
my having a  peripheral  nervous  activity  now,  which,  in  turn,  has  as  a 
determinable my having some metabolic activity now. As with the case of 
pain,  we  can  establish  more  determinate  properties  as  well  until  a 
maximally  determined  one  such  as  my  having  the  release  of  this 
neurotransmitter from these cells now. These two chains of determinations, 
I think, cannot be identified or crossed without begging the question of the 
mind-body relation. If we did it, by taking for granted that the two chains 
are simply different ways of referring to the same phenomenon, we would 
“solve” the problem by an unexplained fiat.
The other alternative is to say that the determination relation should 
not be conceived as a conceptual relation, but rather as an empirical one. 
However  devising the  way in  which determination can be  construed in 
non-conceptual  terms  is  a  task  that  has  not  been faced yet.  An  option 
would be that of construing this empirical relation in terms of constitution. 
If this route is taken, we have to renounce to tropes’ being abstract in the 
sense previously exposed. In fact, we saw that abstractness was the result 
of space-time compresence of two type different properties. Red and round 
are type different and compresent resulting thereby abstract. The lump of 
clay and the statue are also type different and compresent, but there is a 
constitution relation, so the lump of clay is the concrete constituent of the 
statue. If the mental state is constituted by the physical state, the latter is 
not abstract anymore, hence not a trope anymore.
Putting  this  point  in  my  previous  terminology,  the  determination 
relations are within trope dimensions, not across them, even if there are 
dimensions that are regularly coinstantiated. If my hearth rhythm increases 
whenever  my  kidney  activity  increases,  and  vice  versa,  nobody  would 
consider  the  property  of  having  an  increasing  kidney  activity  as  a 
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determinable of the property of having an increasing heart activity, to adapt 
a famous example by Quine.
On the event side, the problem is not to have an event instantiating 
more than one property at a time, but the relation between the properties 
instantiated. For instance, consider a rake: it has a wooden brown handle 
and an iron black toothed bar. If I detach the handle from the toothed bar, 
this very event is also the separation of wood from iron, of a brown thing 
from a black thing, of a less flexible shape from a more flexible shape, and 
so on. I can even have multiple purposes and intentions in separating one 
part of the rake from the other. Such an event, though, would not constitute 
a metaphysical achievement or a cue on the relations between wood and 
iron, handle and toothed bar, brown and black.
One may want to stick with the determinable/determinate relation, 
after rejecting my previous argument of the two chains of determination, 
by saying that it confuses the proper determinables for any given trope. If 
so,  a  second  argument  can  be  marshalled,  which  focuses  on  tropes’ 
simplicity as a feature that is not compatible with their belonging to two or 
more resemblance classes. Consider, for instance, a red trope: anything that 
is red is coloured as well. However, any trope is a maximally determinate 
entity: you cannot have entities in space and time that are “generic” in the 
sense  of  being coloured but  not  of  some specific  colour.  This  red is  a 
maximally determinate shade of red. It is coloured as well, true, but such a 
determination relation is conceptual, while the relation between tropes does 
not seem to be of this kind, if tropes are maximally determinate entities. In 
fact, the compresence of two or more tropes is a matter of contingent and 
empirical fact. If being coloured is considered as a trope side by side with 
red, then its compresence with red would be necessary and conceptual. But 
tropes were postulated to give us a metaphysically firmer grip on reality, 
and it  seems to me that  such a grip would be lost  in case such purely 
conceptual tropes were admitted.
Renouncing the idea that tropes are maximally determinate coincides 
with giving up one of the crucial features that distinguishes tropes from 
universals. For instance, taking red—as the generic determinable of scarlet, 
crimson, …—as a trope would make it wholly present in many places at 
the same time or in the same places at different times, raising again the 
“metaphysical scandal”, as Campbell considered this feature when applied 
to  universals.  At  the  same  time,  if  red  is  not  taken  as  a  maximally 
determinate shade of colour, it becomes a categorical name for a certain 
range of light, the one that goes from, say, crimson to scarlet. So, it is a 
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categorical  mistake to  take  the  generic  red to be  a  trope as  specific  as 
scarlet, analogous to those mistakes described by Ryle 1949 in taking the 
name “University” to be referring to another and specific College building, 
one different from those visited so far.
A final argument against  the identification of physical  and mental 
tropes takes these to be maximally determinate. The gist of the argument is 
that having two maximally determinate tropes does not entail having two 
simple tropes in the same way. A mental trope, being captured by an inner 
act of acquaintance, is definitively phenomenally simple; I grasp it. But it 
does not mean that it is structurally simple. My being in pain, now, could 
correspond  to  a  very  complex  neuronal  activity,  which  is  structurally 
complex. As a matter of fact, this is what neuroscience tells us. C-fibre and 
A-δ fibres concur in giving us this sensation which is pain. We take it to be 
simple, but it is so only under a phenomenological perspective, not from a 
structural one. So, the two tropes cannot be identified, because one is not 
further  decomposable,  hence  simple  on  both  readings  of  simplicity, 
whereas the other is decomposable, and so is complex, even though they 
are both maximally determinate. Since simplicity is a crucial feature for 
tropes identification, the purported identity fails. 
4. A little coda
One may think that an inevitable consequence of the extensionality of the 
causal relation is that of having many tropes instantiated at once, a point 
raised by Davidson and taken up by Robb and the MacDonalds. Such a 
view, moreover, would sidestep the so-called qua issue, that is, the vexed 
question of “is it in virtue of this or that aspect that the trope was causally 
relevant?” Both Davidson and Robb dismiss the question from the very 
beginning.  Davidson has  a  purely extensionalist  view of  causation,  and 
Robb seems to take the strictly singular individuation condition for tropes 
as the key to solve the issue:
A  causally  relevant  property  F simply  does  not  have  various 
aspects such that one can legitimately ask whether some but not 
others are responsible for F’s being causally relevant. 
Robb 1997, 191.
Noordhof has attacked Robb on this ground. He says:
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Did the glass shatter as a result of the soprano’s singing a note in 
virtue of its  pitch or its  meaning? We want the answer that it is 
the pitch … how does the trope theorist get this answer? What 
stops  someone  from  saying  that  the  meaning  of  the  note  is 
causally  relevant  because  the  meaning trope is  identical  to the 
pitch trope? 
Noordhof 1998, 225
The problem, according to Noordhof, lies in the identity conditions 
for tropes, which are at this point taken to involve a supervenience relation 
between the types to which the soprano note belongs. This is no solution, 
though, because we are back to the original problem of mental causation, 
thus pushed back to our starting point.12
Robb replies that the task of determining the individuation conditions 
for tropes is a red herring when it  comes to establishing the identity of 
mental and physical tropes, because such an identity is secured by the fact 
that tropes reconcile the three principles of  Distinctness,  Closure and, in 
particular,  Relevance.13 So,  the  task  of  detailing  the  individuating 
conditions for tropes can be pursued after trope monism has been granted 
(cf. Robb 1998, 94)14. However, it is far from clear whether trope monism 
has  been  so  secured,  for  the  trading  in  the  property  “ambiguity”  is 
precisely what raises the problem. In fact, trope monism cannot be secured 
by endorsing Distinctness, because the very notion of property used in that 
principle serves the purpose of differentiating between mental and physical 
types of tropes. Thus, the only option left, the one compatible with Closure 
and  Relevance,  is  space-time  localization.  However,  the  possibility  of 
affirming the co-localization of two tropes is not enough for establishing 
their identity: the rotation of the Earth and its cooling down are two tropes 
occurring at the same time and in the same place, they coincide as to their 
four-dimensional  world-line,  but  are  two  different  tropes,  individuated 
through two different  causal  powers,  or  aspects  or  at  any  rate  the  two 
12 Sidney Shoemaker has raised a similar worry (2001, 433-4),
13 Orilia  (personal  communication)  has  suggested  that  it  should  be  the  other  way 
around: assuming trope identity allows one to salvage the three principles. However, I 
am interpreting what Robb has to say on this, more than affirming it myself.
14 Moreover,  Robb  thinks  that  another  advantage  in  introducing  tropes  instead  of 
events as the properties of causation is that these are not the relata of causal relations 
(contrast with Ehring 1997 on this point), rather they are the properties that determine 
such relations.
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tropes are simply prima facie quite different. We cannot say that they are 
one and the same simple trope, because they do not have the same causal 
powers,  the same conceptual role or whatever preliminary individuation 
conditions for tropes you like. Co-localization is not enough for identity 
(cf. Casati and Varzi 1996). 
It  is even possible to affirm, with Lowe 1994,  533, that  “abstract 
objects, both universals and particulars, have timeless identity-conditions”, 
and are not spatial either. The same applies to mental and physical tropes: 
even if my belief that  p and my brain state  b were occurring in the very 
same portion of space-time, this would not secure their identity. This can 
be  shown  by  reductio  ad  absurdum as  follows.  Take  my  supposedly 
enduring belief that I am Simone. I retained it since time t and up to time 
t΄. Suppose that the relevant neurons that were active at t when I held that 
belief  have  died  and  that  I  hold  such  a  belief  at  t΄ in  virtue  of  other 
neurons. Since nothing relevant is physically the same, it is not possible to 
argue  that  I  retained  the  same  belief,  because  all  the  spatio-temporal 
conditions have changed. Hence, persistent beliefs are not possible. If these 
are not possible, it is not even possible to change one’s own mind, this 
being the result of transforming one of one’s own enduring beliefs, but this 
is absurd. (I have used a line of reasoning quite familiar in the semantic 
debate concerning holism.)
The upshot of this discussion, I think, is that the red herring lies in 
fixing the individuation condition for tropes  prima facie in their spatio-
temporal locations. Such condition is the result of trading in the property 
“ambiguity”,  because  the  difference  between  mental  and  physical 
properties in Distinctness is established for types (or resemblance classes) 
while  their  identity  is  established  in  the  trope  reading  of  Closure and 
Relevance, where the only condition for setting the identity in such cases is 
spatio-temporal co-localization. If the co-localization is a red herring for 
the  individuation  conditions,  what  is  left  for  individuation  is  the  very 
property itself. This is not surprising after all: when two tropes are placed 
in the same resemblance class, or are judged to be precisely similar, they 
are so not by virtue of co-localization but simply by virtue of being the 
very properties that they are. Such an option, though, is not open to Robb 
and  Davidson,  because  they  want  to  maintain  Distinctness.  This 
unsurprising  result,  then,  has  serious  consequences  for  the  attempt  to 
rescue a Davidsonian strategy in the mental causation debate.
It should be noticed that not even an appeal to the modal status of 
tropes could be of some help. Just as the loud shot could not possibly be 
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the silent shot, the same event could not be mental and physical by fiat. To 
say otherwise would be committing oneself to some petitio principii. So, if 
spatio-temporal co-localization is not enough to secure the identity needed 
to maintain Closure and Relevance in spite of Distinctness, what is left to 
this end? Nothing else, I think. Tropes, then, reveal themselves as useless 
for solving the problem of mental causation. One may wonder whether this 
conclusion is limited to the problem of mental causation or can be applied 
to causation in general. It seems to me that the difficult issue in the case of 
causation is raised by Relevance, where different levels of description are 
at stake. In this respect, tropes do not seem to provide a substantial help, 
being  tailored  to  solve  the  metaphysical  scandal  of  having  entities,  as 
universals could be taken to be, scattered in space and time. However, if 
this scandal  is of  some help in solving a conundrum, as causation is,  I 
prefer  to  live  with  it  rather  than  adopt  entities  with  unstable  identity(-
conditions).
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